

**When History moves on:  
The Foundations and Diffusion of a Second Demographic Transition.**

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## **1. Introduction**

The first demographic transition refers to the original declines in fertility and mortality, as witnessed in western countries already from the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries onward, and during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century in the rest of the world. At present, there is hardly any country left without a beginning of a fertility decline brought by the manifest use of contraception. Moreover, this first demographic transition (FDT) was equally accompanied by an overhaul of traditional family formation systems. In the West, the control of fertility within wedlock occurred in tandem with a reduction in final celibacy and a lowering of ages at marriage, signaling a major departure from its old Malthusian nuptiality system. In the rest of the world, early marriage for women – often the result of arrangements between families or lineages – gave way to much later marriage, partly because of more individual partner choice and partly as a response to economic factors. But on the whole, William Goode's prediction of 1963 forecasting a rise in non-western ages at marriage, has largely been borne out by the record of the last 40 years. This increase in ages at marriage has furthermore been a major component in the overall fertility decline in many such countries.

One cannot be but impressed by the speed of the fertility and nuptiality changes associated with the FDT. In the 1960s, nobody dared forecasting that several sub-Saharan African populations would begin adopting contraception already in the 1980s, and that almost all of them would do so prior to 2000. With the exception of rapidly modernizing and industrializing countries of the Far East, such as Japan after the war, and then Taiwan and South Korea, fertility transitions were rare prior to 1970. Demographic giants such as India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia still seemed far away from their FDT in fertility. It was believed that cultural and economic factors jointly formed a formidable obstacle to it. Now, some thirty years later, nobody believes in "formidable obstacles" anymore. In this very short period of time, world history has taken a decisive turn. Evidently, the feature of the demographic growth momentum, linked to the young age distribution of the world population, will still produce substantial population growth over the next forty years, but the foundations for the end of global population expansion were definitely laid in the 1970-2000 period.

But even before the FDT started spreading from the West and Japan to the LDCs, western populations were initiating a move that would take them way beyond what classic "demographic transition theory" had forecasted. The fertility decline did not stop in the close vicinity of two children on average, and western marriage would not

stay early or attract the vast majority of men and women. The end product does not seem to be a balanced stationary population with zero population growth and little or no need for immigrants. The “second demographic transition” (SDT) brings sustained sub-replacement fertility, a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, the disconnection between marriage and procreation, and no stationary population. Instead, western populations face declining sizes, and if it were not for immigration, that decline would have started already in many European countries. In addition, extra gains in longevity at older ages in tandem with sustained sub-replacement fertility will produce a major ageing effect as well.

The first signs of the SDT emerge already in the 1950s: divorce rates were rising, especially in the US and Scandinavia, and the departure from a life-long commitment was justified by the logic that a “good divorce is better than a bad marriage”. Later on and from the second half of the 1960s onward, also fertility started falling from its overall “baby boom” high. Moreover, the trend with respect to ages at first marriage was reversed again, and proportions single started rising. Soon thereafter it became evident that premarital cohabitation was on the rise and that divorce and widowhood were followed less by remarriage and more by post-marital cohabitation. By the 1980s even procreation within cohabiting unions had spread from Scandinavia to the rest of Western Europe. Both France and the UK now have more than 40 percent of all births occurring out of wedlock. In 1960 both had 6 percent.

The notion of a second demographic transition has been criticized from different angles. For instance, it would merely be the continuation of the one and only transition (e.g. Cliquet, 1992). Or, according to David Coleman (2003), it would not be a “second transition”, but merely a “secondary feature”. The SDT would, still according to Coleman, not even be demographic in nature, but only a “partial analysis of life style preferences”. Others have pointed to the regional variations, which are indeed quite substantial, or have argued that it is an arch-typical Western European (+ Canadian, Australian, US) feature which would not spread to Southern or to Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, the demographic changes in the latter parts of Europe could be accounted for by the economic crisis associated with the transition from Communist to market economies, without involving the operation of a cultural shift at all. And finally, Coleman poses the question of the SDT spreading further to Asia or other continents. His answer is obviously that it will not: “it is solely a parochial Western European idiosyncrasy”.

With these criticisms in mind, we can set the task for the present paper by posing the following questions:

- Is the SDT indeed merely the continuation of the FDT, and only a secondary “non-demographic” feature?
- Is the SDT spreading to the rest of Europe, and to the Mediterranean and Eastern European countries in particular?
- Is the role of the cultural factor negligible in Central or Eastern Europe, and are their demographic changes purely a response to the economic crisis following the transition to market economies?
- Can the SDT spread to other continents and societies? And if so, why?

## **2. Is the SDT merely the continuation of the FDT ?**

The idea of the *distinctness* of the SDT stems directly from Philippe Ariès's analysis of the history of childhood (1962) and, as Dick van de Kaa and I have repeatedly pointed out, from his 1980 Bad Homburg paper on the two successive and distinct motivations for parenthood. During the FDT, the decline in fertility was "unleashed by an enormous sentimental and financial investment in the child" (i.e., the "king child era" to use Ariès's term), whereas the motivation during the SDT is adult self-realization within the role or life style as a parent or more complete and fulfilled adult. This major shift is also propped up by the innovation of hormonal and other forms of highly efficient contraception. During the FDT the issue was to adopt contraception in order to avoid pregnancies; during the SDT the basic decision is to stop contraception in order to start a pregnancy.

The other "root" of the SDT-theory was connected to a reaction of van de Kaa and myself toward the cyclical fertility theory, as formulated by Richard Easterlin (1973). In this theory, small cohorts would have better employment opportunities and hence earlier marriage and higher fertility, whereas large cohorts would have the opposite life chances and inversed demographic responses. The theory accounts very nicely for the marriage and baby boom of the 1960s, and also for the subsequent "baby bust" of the 1970s. But the theory equally predicts further cycles produced by the earlier ones, and hence expects a return of fertility to above replacement levels when smaller cohorts reach the reproductive span. By the middle of the 1980s we had become convinced that sub-replacement fertility was not only going to last much longer, but could even become an "intrinsic" feature of a new demographic regime. Exits the model of an ultimate stationary population with a long-term population equilibrium, and exits the improved version of it with cyclical fertility swings around replacement fertility.

Having pointed out the intellectual origins of the SDT, we shall now turn to a more systematic treatment of the contrasts between the FDT and the SDT. Table 1 gives a summary of the points to be discussed.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

### **2.1. Opposite nuptiality regimes**

As already indicated, a first major contrast between the FDT and SDT is the opposite trend in nuptiality. In Western Europe the Malthusian late marriage pattern weakens, mainly as the result of the growth of wage earning labor, and this basic trend toward earlier and more universal marriage continues all the way till the middle of the 1960s. Hence, the lowest mean ages at first marriage since the Renaissance were reached in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Furthermore, the pockets in Western Europe where cohabitation and out of wedlock fertility had remained high during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century were under siege during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Such behavior was not in line with both the religious and the secular views on what constituted a proper family. Extra-marital fertility rates all decline in Europe after 1900.

By contrast, after 1965, ages at marriage rose again and cohort proportions ever-married started declining (Council of Europe, 2004). This resulted not only from the insertion of an interim period of premarital cohabitation, but also from later home leaving and more and longer single living. The very rapid prolongation of education for both sexes since the 1950s and the ensuing change in educational composition of Western populations contributed to this process. But the unfolding of the nuptiality features of the SDT did not solely stop at a rise in ages at marriage and at a mere insertion of an interim “student” period. Post-marital cohabitation too was on the rise, and so was procreation outside wedlock. And in many instances the latter trend is to some extent a “revenge of history”: cohabitation and procreation by non-married couples is now often highest where the custom prevailed longest during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries.

The next contrast between FDT and SDT pertains to divorce and remarriage. The FDT is preoccupied with strengthening marriage and the family, and divorce legislation remains strict. The State offers little opposition to religious doctrine in this respect. Divorce on the basis of mutual consent is rare, but mostly based on proven adultery. The SDT witnesses the end of a long period of low divorce rates and the principle of a unique, life-long legal partnership is questioned. This takes the form of a rational “utility” evaluation of a marriage in terms of the welfare of each of the adult partners first and children second. This is accompanied by attacking the hypocrisy of the earlier restrictive divorce legislation that fostered concubinage instead. The outcome in Western Europe, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand was a succession of legal liberalizations in the wake of a singularly rising demographic trend. And, as pointed out in the introduction, the onset of the rise in divorce was probably the very first manifestation of the accentuation of individual autonomy in opposing the moral order prescribed by Church and State.

And last, but not least, FDT and SDT have also opposite patterns of remarriage. During the former, remarriages were essentially involving widows and widowers, whereas remarriage for divorced persons meant a new beginning and the start of a new family: “new children for a new life-long commitment”. In other words, even if divorce occurred, the institution of marriage was not under serious threat, and remarriage propped up fertility as well. Nothing of this is left in the SDT: remarriages among widowed or divorced persons decline in favor of cohabitation or other looser arrangements such as LAT-relationships or close and intimate friendships. This may not only have tax advantages or protect the inheritance rights of one's own children, but it essentially leaves all further options open and safeguards individual autonomy. In other words, also these arrangements are manifestations of the new individual desire to keep an “*open future*” with a minimal loss in social capital.

## 2.2. Fertility contrasts.

The SDT is not merely focusing on changing nuptiality and family patterns as David Coleman pretends, but equally concerned with fertility. We would like to recall that it were Philippe Ariès's piece on two successive *fertility* motivations and Easterlin's work on a cyclical *fertility* model that started the ball rolling. And even if that were not the case, how can fertility be studied in isolation, i.e. without regard to the fundamental changes in overall patterns of household formation and without the framework of changing preference structures regarding life styles?

During the FDT fertility becomes increasingly confined to marriage, contraception affects mostly fertility at older ages and higher marriage durations, mean ages at first parenthood decline, and among married couples childlessness is low. There are examples of below-replacement fertility during the FDT, but these correspond to exceptional periods of deep economic crises or war only. Sub-replacement fertility is not an intrinsic characteristic of the FDT. Under better conditions, as for instance after World War II, fertility levels are well above replacement level, and this not only holds for period indicators but also for cohort levels. The “baby boom” and the “marriage” boom of the late 50s and early 60s are the last typical features of the FDT (whereas rising divorce in that period signals the start of the SDT). Another salient characteristic of the FDT fertility regime was its reliance on imperfect contraception. Until the 1960s, *coitus interruptus* was largely the method used by the working classes and rhythm by the higher educated or more religious couples. Both methods led to contraceptive failures and unintended pregnancies, and these also kept fertility above replacement level. Particularly such parity failures at higher ages became increasingly undesirable and fuelled the demand for more efficient contraception.

The SDT starts with a multifaceted revolution, and all aspects of it impact on fertility. Firstly, there was a *contraceptive revolution* with the invention of the pill and the re-invention of IUDs. All of these were perfected very rapidly, and particularly hormonal contraception was suited for postponing and spacing purposes. A.J. Coale’s 1974 “learning curve” of contraception, which was monotonically increasing with age and which fitted the FDT experience so well, was no longer applicable in the West. After an interim period with increased incidence of “shotgun marriages” (often 1965-75), the use of highly efficient and reliable contraception starts at young ages and permits postponement of child-bearing as a goal in its own right. Secondly, there was also a *sexual revolution*, and it was a forceful reaction to the notions that sex is confined to marriage and mainly for procreation only. The younger generations sought the value of sex for its own sake and accused the generation of their parents of hypocrisy. Ages at first sexual intercourse decline during the SDT. Thirdly, there was the *gender revolution*. Women were no longer going to be subservient to men and husbands, but seize the right to regulate fertility themselves. They did no longer undergo the “fatalities of nature”, and this pressing wish for “biological autonomy” was articulated by subsequent quests for the liberalization of induced abortion. Finally, these “three revolutions” fit within the framework of an overall rejection of authority and of a complete overhaul of the normative structure. Parents, educators, churches, army and much of the entire State apparatus end up in the dock. This entire ideational reorientation, if not revolution, occurs during the peak years of economic growth, and shapes all aspects of the SDT.

The overall outcome with respect to the SDT fertility pattern is its marked degree of postponement. Mean ages at first parenthood for women in sexual unions rise quite rapidly and to unprecedented levels in several Western European populations. The net outcome is sub-replacement fertility: without the ethnic component (such as Hispanics and Blacks in the US or Maoris in New Zealand) all OECD countries have sub-replacement fertility. Admittedly, period measures such as the TFR are extra depressed as a result of continued postponing, but even the end of such postponement is not likely to bring period fertility back to 2.05 children. Most cohorts of the worlds white (+ Japanese) national populations born after 1960 will not make it to that level

(cf. Frejka and Calot, 2001; Lesthaeghe, 2001, Council of Europe, 2004). However, the degree of heterogeneity is substantial and by no means solely the outcome of ethnic composition factors. In the West, Scandinavian, British and French cohorts born in 1960 still come close to replacement fertility, whereas these cohort levels fall below 1.70 in Austria, the whole of Germany and Italy. In Central and Eastern Europe, the cohort of 1960 will still get to two children on average, but not in the Russian Federation, Slovenia and the three Baltic countries (Council of Europe, 2004). Moreover, in Western and Southern European countries with current total period fertility rates below 1.5, the catching up of fertility at the later childbearing ages, i.e. after age 30, has simply remained too weak to offset the postponement effect. The result of sustained sub-replacement fertility is that another, but originally unanticipated trait of the SDT may be in the making: continued reliance on international migration to partially offset the population decline that would otherwise emerge within a few years.

Evidently, we are very far from the ideal FDT outcome of a new stationary population corresponding to high life expectancies, replacement fertility, and little need for immigration. And we are getting further and further removed from the FDT prop of that demographic model, i.e. the dominance of a single form of living arrangement for couples and children (namely marriage). Finally, the linchpin of the FDT system has totally eroded: collective behavior is no longer kept on track by a strong normative structure based on a familistic ideology supported by both Church and State. Instead, the new regime is governed by the primacy of individual freedom of choice. Or as van de Kaa (2003) has put it, fertility is now merely a “*derivative*”, meaning that it is the outcome of a prolonged “*process of self-reflection and self-confrontation on the part of prospective parents.... Then the pair will weigh a great many issues, direct and opportunity costs included, but their guiding light is self-confrontation: would a conception and having a child be self-fulfilling?*”

### 2.3. Underlying societal contrasts.

So far, we have mainly discussed the differences between the FDT and SDT in terms of their demographic contrasts. But both demographic transitions have of course their roots in two distinct historical periods of societal development. Table 1 again contains a summary.

With the exception of the very early fertility decline in France and a few other smaller areas in Europe, much of the FDT is an integral part of a development phase in which economic growth fosters material aspirations and improvements in material living conditions. The preoccupations of the 1860-1960 period were mainly concerned with increasing household real income, improving working and housing conditions, raising standards of health and life expectancy, improving human capital by investing in education, and providing a safety net for all via the gradual construction of a social security system. In Europe, these social goals were shared and promoted by all ideological, religious or political factions or “pillars”. And in this endeavor solidarity was a central concept. All pillars also had their views on the desirable evolution of the family. For the religious pillars these views were based on the holiness of matrimony in the first place, but their defense of a closely knit conjugal family also stemmed from fears that the industrial society would lead to immorality, social pathology and to atheism. The secular pillars (i.e. Liberal and Socialist) equally saw the family as a

first line of defense against the social ills of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, and as the foundation for their building of a new social order. Hence, although for different reasons, all pillars considered the family as the cornerstone of society. Both material and moral uplifting would furthermore be served best by a sharp gender-based division of labor within the family: husbands assume their responsibilities as devoted breadwinners, and wives become the caretakers of all quality related matters. For this to be realized, male incomes needed to be high enough so that women could assume the role of housewives. In other words, all pillars, including the Socialist and even Communist ones, contributed to the *embourgeoisement* of the working class through this propagation of the breadwinner – housewife model.

In short, for all social classes there should be a single family model and it should be served by highly ordered life course transitions: no marriage without solid financial basis or prospects, and procreation strictly within wedlock. The Malthusian preconditions of a “prudent” marriage were readapted to the social aspirations of the new industrial society.

The SDT, on the other hand, is founded on the rise of the “higher order needs” as, for instance, defined by Maslow (1954). Once the basic material preoccupations, and particularly that of long term financial security, are satisfied via welfare state provisions, more existential and expressive needs become articulated. These are centered on *self-actualization* in formulating goals, *individual autonomy* in choosing means, and *recognition* for their realization. These features emerge in a variety of domains, and this is why the SDT can be linked to such a wide variety of empirical indicators of ideational change.

In the political sphere such higher order or “post-materialist” (Inglehart, 1970) needs deal, *inter alia*, with the quest for more direct, grassroots democracy, openness of government, rejection of political patronage, decline of life-long loyalty to political or religious pillars (= “depillarization”), and the rise of ecological and other quality rather than quantity oriented issues on the political agenda. The downturn of it all is rising distrust in politics and institutions and growing political anomy that can fuel right wing extremism. The state is no longer viewed in terms of a benign provider, but again more as an Orwellian “big brother”. A corollary thereof is the disengagement from civic, professional and community oriented networks (e.g. Putnam, 2000). It is likely, however, that they were partially substituted by more expressive (fitness clubs, meditation gatherings ...) or more affective (friendships) types of social capital. Work values and socialization values equally display a profound shift in favor of the expressive traits, and above all, away from respect for authority. In the former sphere, one is no longer satisfied with good material conditions (pay, job security, vacations), but more and more expressive traits are being valued (e.g. interesting work, contact with others, work that meets ones abilities, challenging and innovative work, variation in tasks, flexible time use, etc.). Obviously this “anti-Fordist” orientation is initially the result of rising education and the growth of white-collar employment (e.g. Kohn, 1977), but it has now spread to all social classes and types of employment. A strong parallel can be found in the domain of socialization as well (e.g. Alwin, 1989): all elements typical of conformity (obedience, order and neatness, thrift and hard work, traditional gender roles, religious faith) and those linked to social orientations (loyalty, solidarity, consideration for others) have gradually given way to expressive traits that stress personality (being interested in how and why, capability of thinking

for oneself, self-presentation, independence and autonomy). Needless to say that the quest for more symmetrical gender relations fits within this overall framework of articulation of higher order needs and expressive social roles.

#### 2.4. One or two transitions?

Evidently the higher order needs can only be articulated if the lower order ones are sufficiently met. Similarly the SDT squarely stands on the shoulders of its predecessor, the FDT. But to consider the SDT features as “secondary” as suggested by David Coleman, or as part and parcel of one sole transition, is another matter. My problem with these views is that they fail to realize both the amplitude of the contrast and the importance of the societal implications for the future.

More specifically, the “One transition only”-view fails to recognize that the FDT and SDT are sufficiently differentiated and even antagonistic in terms of most family formation variables (including fertility motivations!). The “unitarian” view furthermore misses the point that FDT and SDT each correspond to two distinct historical phases, have a distinct “*logique sociale*”, and are buttressed by distinct patterns of political organization as well. In short, the “One transition view” simply blurs history.

Last but not least, the demographic implications of the SDT for the future are fundamentally different from the equilibrium implication of the FDT. The SDT expects much rougher seas ahead: (1) more pronounced aging as a result of sub-replacement fertility, and hence more pressure on the welfare state foundations, (2) more reliance on immigration and consequently a further expansion of multi-ethnicity and multi-cultural traits in societies, (3) less stress on social cohesion (e.g. Surkyn, 2004), and (4) a greater incidence of family instability and concomitant social problems (e.g. poverty among singles or in one-parent households). As K. Kiernan warned: “*the SDT is not kind to all*”.

So far, we have explained why it makes sense to make distinctions and to number the successive historical moves from one system to the next. In the following section we shall address the issue of the geographical diffusion of the SDT to other parts of Europe.

### **3. Is the SDT only a Northern and Western European idiosyncrasy?**

Towards the end of the 1980s, several features of the SDT seemed to stop at the northern slopes of Alps and Pyrenees: the incidence of cohabitation remained very low, and also the rise in extra-marital fertility was either absent or very modest. Instead, younger adults predominantly remained in or stayed attached to their parental homes. Also until 1990, earlier patterns of both marriage and fertility had been maintained in Central and Eastern Europe. Fifteen years ago, one could still argue that the SDT would remain a “parochial” idiosyncrasy, limited to Western and Northern Europe. Admittedly, the SDT features had emerged in European populations across



the oceans (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the US), but they failed to cross two other geo-political divides on the old continent.

### 3.1. Central and Eastern Europe

For Central and Eastern Europe, this picture changed completely after the collapse of the Communist regimes in 1989. All SDT features emerged simultaneously: ages at first marriage, which had remained quite young during the preceding era, started increasing, premarital cohabitation rose, and so did proportions extra-marital births. In tandem with later union formation there was also a dramatic postponement of fertility at all ages and parities, leading to a precipitous drop of period indicators. In Central and Eastern Europe, TFRs fell below 1.5 children and even below 1.3. A new term was coined: “*lowest low fertility*” (Kohler et al., 2001). Evidently, period measures can be dramatically depressed when such systematic postponement occurs. However, the degree to which there could be catching up in cohort fertility is still uncertain, and so is the amount of recovery in prospective period TFR-levels. But the outcome seems to be that fertility will stay well below replacement at any rate. In 2002, all former Communist countries still had TFRs below 1.35, and as low as 1.10 (Ukraine). The sole exceptions were Albania, with a TFR probably around 2.0, and Macedonia together with Serbia-Montenegro with levels around 1.75.

Initially, few observers in the former Communist countries thought that this could be the start of a SDT. Especially the older generation of demographers was highly skeptical about the concept to start with, and remained convinced that these marked marriage and massive fertility postponements were exclusively the consequence of the economic crisis. Also the UN Economic Commission for Europe initially held this view (2000). And the transition to capitalism was indeed a very painful one: there was the end of guaranteed life-long employment, a reduction in activity rates for women, a steep drop in the standard of living, a decline in state support for families, a privatization of the housing sector, and in several countries also a highly visible rise in poverty. But there was also a countercurrent of younger demographers, mainly in Russia (Zakharov and Ivanova, 1996, Zakharov, 1997) and especially the Czech Republic (Zeman et al., 2001, Rabusic, 2001, Sobotka, 2002) who thought that not only the crisis was to be held responsible, but that a SDT could be in the making as well. In fact, after 1997 the economy of several of the former Communist countries was recovering and so were per capita incomes. But there was no return to earlier patterns of marriage, nor an end to fertility postponement. Also the steady rise in extra-marital fertility, which, incidentally, often started *before* 1989, continued and even accelerated (see Figure 1). Of 18 such countries, only 5 still had proportions of extra-marital births below 20% in 2002. At the upper tail of the distribution, 4 had already reached Northern European levels of above 40% (Council of Europe, 2004). Fifteen years earlier, these countries had percentages between 3 and 15 only, and solely the former GDR stood out with 34% extramarital births in 1985. These rapid increases are admittedly also the result of the rise in proportions of first births in the declining total, but they undeniably reflect that procreation outside marriage and in cohabiting unions is rapidly spreading in Central and Eastern Europe as well.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The verdict seems to be that the economic crisis had indeed destabilized the earlier demographic regime, but also that the SDT had been in the making before 1990, and that it is developing further, i.e. also during economic recoveries. In other words, the SDT is emerging in Central and Eastern Europe as a feature that is there to stay, just as in the West. Once more is it emerging as a salient characteristic of capitalist economies and of cultures that recognize the primacy of individual autonomy and that develop the higher order needs.

#### 4.2. Southern Europe.

As indicated earlier, also the demographic patterns of Southern Europe, from Portugal to Greece, have been considered as an exception to the theory of two successive transitions. In fact, in one crucial respect these countries were not an exception at all, since their marriage and fertility postponements were even more pronounced than in Western and Northern Europe. The postponement started later than in the West, but the intensity was equally striking. Moreover, as was also true for a few Western countries like Austria and to some degree also of Germany (former FRG), cohort fertility patterns in Southern Europe hardly exhibit signs of fertility recuperation after age 30 (Lesthaeghe, 2001; Calot and Frejka, 2001). This means that not only progression to the second or third child are rarer than in Northern and Western Europe, but also that in the younger cohorts larger proportion -- typically in excess of 20% -- will not make it to parenthood at all. All of that together is of course a recipe for prolonged "lowest low" fertility, and not for a temporary dip and swift return to replacement level. Hence, seen from the fertility angle, Southern Europe did follow the overall postponement trends in nuptiality and fertility, and these countries are by no means exceptions to these core SDT-features.

What made the Southern European starting pattern of the SFT so special and so exceptional when compared to their northern neighbors was the absence of home leaving in favor of independent single living or in favor of premarital cohabitation. Furthermore, marriage still remained the predominant precondition for procreation. In other words, a part of the SDT-package was missing. Cohesive explanations for this syndrome have been offered by R. Palomba (1995), G. Micheli (1996, 2000), and G. Dalla Zuanna (2001). The latter author also directly refers to D. Reher's (1998) distinction between the historically "strong family system" of Southern Europe and the traditionally "weak" one of Western and Northern Europe.

In the "weak system" children can leave the parental household before marriage, and then they fend for themselves in an interim period of celibacy prior to marriage. Historically, they became servants, apprentices, landless and/or seasonal laborers, industrial workers, soldiers, seamen, or clergymen. In contemporary Northern and Western Europe, welfare provisions still stress this earlier independence via sufficient student housing, scholarships, student transportation subsidies, youth unemployment benefits and employment programs, and even guaranteed minimum incomes for single persons older than 18 and no longer living at home. The result is still earlier home leaving for independent living, sharing or cohabiting. Moreover, young adults learn to take on responsibilities and coping strategies, which are all needed later on in life. Even men learn to stand on their own feet, also when typical household tasks are involved. Greater gender symmetry also fosters higher female employment rates, and vice versa. The household standard of living is based on dual incomes, but women can

take off spells of time for family reasons (e.g. maternity leave, optional leaves for child-rearing or caring for sick partner or parent, etc). Either or both partners can also opt for part-time employment, and labor market flexibility enhances these options. Furthermore, this system is perfectly compatible with the shift toward expressive values and roles, and it creates less tension between self-fulfillment and parenthood.

In the “strong family” type, familial ties and solidarity – even allegiance to alliances of families as in Southern Italy -- are more persistent throughout life. Men and women only leave the parental family to marry, and sons can even bring their wife into the parental home. Men are looked after by their mother and then immediately thereafter by their wife. The old gender roles persist and men stay away from housework. Furthermore, the family bonds continue to function throughout life, both between siblings (e.g. in business) and between generations. Older people are still taken in by their children. Mediterranean societies furthermore developed their welfare provisions on the assumption that such strong familial solidarity would continue to hold, and they have very few provisions that allow young adults to become economically more independent. On top of that, housing falls largely within the private sector, and most couples want to become home-owners. The resulting relative high housing costs tend to retard the departure. The overall outcome has been that home leaving is much later than in Western and Northern Europe, and that there is little cohabitation or fertility among unmarried couples. Instead, young adults continue to live in their “guilted nests” provided by caring parents. And for women, motherhood also means dropping out of the labor force, not only because this is to be expected from a “good mother”, but also because child care facilities are scarce and the returning to an earlier job more difficult. Opportunity costs are hence increased as a consequence of the persistence of old role patterns and inflexible labor markets. The ultimate outcome is what Dalla Zuanna calls “a Pyrrhus victory of the strong family system”, because, quite paradoxically, it will disappear for lack of adaptive capacity and lack of children.

But, does history stop here? Will the Mediterranean demographic system maintain this hitherto characteristic lack of alternative household types occupied by younger adults? The presence of such households is not routinely flagged by European registration systems, and hence we have to wait for special surveys (or an occasional census) to monitor changes in household forms. Given that the European Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) of the early 1990s are outdated by now, and really give the history of the 1970s and 1980s at any rate, we are short of indicators. The major exception is that most European countries still make the distinction between births occurring within marriage and out of wedlock. From this information we cannot infer the respective shares of extra-marital births contributed by single mothers and by cohabiting couples. But, as the record has shown for most continental Western and Northern European countries, the lion’s share has gone to the latter. Hence, extra-marital fertility provides an imperfect, but still very useful early indicator of SDT progression to one of the later phases, i.e. that of procreation within cohabitation.

Figure 2 gives the percentage of extra-marital births for the Southern European countries. This figure is directly comparable to the one provided for Central and Eastern Europe. And the outcome is quite revealing. Portugal – which historically had a tradition of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock fertility (cf. Livi-Bacci, 1971) in its southern provinces – has had steadily increasing proportions of extra-marital births since the 1970s. And if the Portuguese figures are compared to those for Western

European countries, displayed on Figure 3, then the Portuguese rise precedes that of the corresponding increase in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany (FRG) and Switzerland. Moreover, Spain started at a lower level, but the Spanish curve runs parallel to Portugal's, and in 2002, Spain's extra-marital births share is larger than Switzerland's. Apparently, the Pyrenees were not that formidable an obstacle to the diffusion of the SDT, and the "strong family system" of Iberia proves to be more adaptive than the Italian authors had estimated for their own country.

#### FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Figure 2 has a few more surprises. Firstly, there is a very steep and continuing increase in out of wedlock fertility in Malta during the last decade. Secondly there has been a steady increase in Italian extra-marital fertility as well. It started from very low levels in the 1960s, but the indicator is now reaching 10%. Judging from this record, the strong family system in Italy may be just that bit stronger than in Portugal, Spain, or Malta, but it is clearly not completely impermeable to the SDT. In fact, Italy is now catching up with the most "conservative" case in the Western European set, i.e. Switzerland, which has already quite a widespread occurrence of cohabitation, but equally matched to a low level of extra-marital fertility limited to 10 % of all births. Thirdly, also the FYR of Macedonia reached the 10% level in 2000. And finally, the last part of the Mediterranean "strong family belt", i.e. Greece and Cyprus also have an upward acceleration of the trend, but the levels of extra-marital fertility are still too low to justify any firmer conclusion. But, if Central and Eastern Europe follow suit, and now also the Iberian countries and Malta, one can imagine that there is also a take-off of non-traditional household forms in Italy or even Macedonia. The Eastern Mediterranean then constitutes the last area to be affected. Compared to 10 years ago, history has moved on in the predicted direction in Southern Europe as well.

#### 3.3. Western and Northern Europe.

To end this section on the European diffusion of the SDT, we would also like to point out that the process is not yet complete in Western and Northern Europe either. As the extra-marital fertility indicator shows, the proportions of births out of wedlock are still increasing in all countries considered on Figure 3, and this includes the ones with the highest incidence of all, namely Iceland, Sweden, Eastern Germany (former GDR), Norway and France. Apparently the figure of 60% of all births being born outside marriage is a possibility for these vanguard countries. Yet, it should also be pointed out that there is a distinctly more conservative version of the Western European SDT in which single living, sharing or cohabitation have become common, but where a marriage is still connected to the transition to parenthood. Then, the parenthood decision often comes first, and the marriage decision follows suit. In such situations extra-marital fertility is also rising but more slowly and at lower levels. Good examples of this variant are Switzerland, Western Germany (former GFR), Belgium (mainly Flanders) and to some extent also the Netherlands. Ireland, by contrast now seems to make the jump from the latter, more conservative category to the former, more advanced SDT category of countries. In fact, Ireland has already crossed the 30% level, whereas in 1980 it barely had 5% of births out of wedlock. History has moved on at the Western frontiers of the continent too – and at quite a pace!

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

#### **4. Value Orientations and Household Choices: the Footprints at the Micro Level.**

The initial article on the SDT (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986) posited that the new living arrangements and cohabitation in particular were the expressions of secular and anti-authoritarian sentiments of better educated younger cohorts with a more egalitarian world view, and who also put greater emphasis on the “higher order needs”. At the same time the correlates of Inglehart’s “post-materialist” orientation were high on the research agenda of the political scientists, and both the Eurobarometer surveys in the EU and the first round of European Values Studies (EVS) of 1981 provided data for more detailed empirical research on attitude and value profiles for various social groups, including those based on living arrangements. Also in the US statistical associations between living arrangements and specific value orientations drew attention. Not only was it realized that cohorts were steadily progressing to higher levels of “post-materialism” (Inglehart, 1985) and other higher order needs (e.g. van Ryssel, 1989), but also that there was a recursive relationship between demographic choices and values orientation. As Thornton and colleagues in Michigan illustrated (1985, 1987, 1992), higher secularism fostered choices in favor of premarital sex and non-traditional household formation patterns, but the latter also reinforced further secularization. In other words, there was a *selection* into various types of behavior based on existing values to start with, and then an *affirmation* or strengthening of these values based on the behavioral choice. Clearly, the statistical associations between value orientations and the various types of households are merely the “*footprints*” of this ongoing life course process of selection followed by affirmation or negation of values. On the basis of successive cross-sections we cannot disentangle the two directions of causation involved. American social scientist took the lead in organizing panel surveys, and it is mainly on the basis of these that the recursive model of selection/adaptation could be checked (e.g. Waite, Koblin and Witsberger, 1986, Axinn and Thornton, 1993, Barber, 1998, Clarkberg, 2002). More recently, also a few European panels measure various value orientations at successive waves, and they too now lend themselves to disentangling the causal components of the recursive relationship (e.g. Moors, 1997, Jansen and Kalmijn, 2002).

##### **4.1. The cross-sectional “footprints” of the recursive selection and adaptation model.**

On the whole, there are now many documented effects of values as they influence choices with respect to family formation (*selection effect*), and of the ways in which the life course choices feed back onto value orientations, either to reinforce or to alter them (*adaptation effect*) (see Lesthaeghe, 2002). The overall picture of the process is given in Figure 4. Firstly, on the vertical axis we have placed two poles: one brings together the non-conformist and more libertarian values (e.g. stress on individual autonomy, less respect for authority, expressive values of self-actualization, secularism, tolerance for alternative behavior and minorities, world-citizenship etc.), and the other the more conventional value orientations (e.g. respect for tradition, ethical and religious values, trust in institutions, solidarity and social cohesion). Secondly, we have put the transitions into the various household states on the horizontal axis, typifying “life course progression”. Upward arrows indicate that a

particular transition in household position is associated with a move in the non-conformist values direction, and downwardly pointing arrows indicate transitions associated with value adaptations in the conformist sense. This leads to the positioning of the various living arrangements along this vertical axis of value orientations. This is also what we shall refer to as the cross-sectional “*footprints*” of the recursive selection/adaptation model.

#### FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

The starting point on Figure 4 is the individuals’ residence in the parental household (*Respar*). At that point, the formative years and late adolescence are approaching completion, and individuals have been subject to the “triple P”-influences (parents, peers, professors). Peer influences have gained importance over time, and also increased parental divorce pushes the value orientations of such young adults in the non-conformist direction. During the next steps in the life course unfolding, it is expected that home leaving in favor of independent single living (*Single*) is predicated on the dominance of non-conformist values, whereas leaving home and directly getting married (*Mar0*) reflects a choice based on conventional value orientations. At the same time, these two choices both reinforce the original values sets in their respective directions.

Singles face the option of moving into cohabitation (*Coh0*) or of marrying (*Mar0*). The former transition strengthens non-conformism even further, also because the cohabiting partner is also likely to be selected on the basis of non-conformist convictions. The mutually reinforcing attitudes of both partners may then enhance the consistency of various values sets, so that childless cohabitants (*Coh0*) can be expected to score highest on all non-conformist sub-dimensions associated with pole 1 on Figure 4. By contrast, singles who move immediately into marriage may do so because of a greater respect for traditional institutions or for their parents’ opinions, or because they choose a partner with a more conservative outlook. Once the institution of marriage is accepted, a move to more conformism is also expected, not in the least because married couples tend to drop the old singles network in favor of new ones with other more like-minded settled couples as well. A similar process of readjustment would also apply to cohabitants who move into marriage prior to parenthood. For them, the value adjustment associated with marriage would be more substantial, given that they come from a strongly non-conformist position. However, it may also be that they never adjust to the same level of conformity as the directly married, and therefore exhibit a *life-long non-conformist imprint* dating back to their earlier cohabitation period. Whenever possible, we shall therefore make a distinction between married couples who *ever* (*E*) and who *never* (*N*) cohabited.

The adjustment effects of parenthood are expected to be even stronger than those of marriage. In fact, values already shift in the conformist direction in anticipation of parenthood, and the transition from cohabitation into marriage is often made as such a form of anticipation. Parenthood corresponds to a firm commitment of both partners and closes open futures. And most importantly, it redirects attention to the well-being of the next generation. Moral, civil and ethical values are reaffirmed and again other social networks – of those with children – are being activated. Tolerance for deviance diminishes, authority gains greater prominence, and more attention is being paid to solidarity and social cohesion. In Figure 4, all positions with children (indicated by a

+ sign) are therefore located further down toward the conformist pole. But, the position of ever-cohabiting married parents ( $Mar+E$ ) remains above that of the never-cohabiting married parents ( $Mar+N$ ).

Finally, a separation or divorce which has not yet been followed by a new partnership ( $FmNu$  = formerly married, not in union) causes a complete overhaul of the value system. New doubts emerge with respect to religion, morality, authority, trust in institutions etc. The individuals are more likely to become self-focused, and therefore pay again greater attention to expressive values and self-actualization. We therefore place the  $FmNu$ -group further toward the non-conformist pole of Figure 4.

The household positions used in Figure 4 are incomplete, and so are the types of transitions. However, they capture the dominant streams of household formation and dissolution through the life course. The main reason for the incompleteness of positions is that surveys do not capture the more complex trajectories. They typically only record the current status, but forget to pose questions about earlier states (i.e. the “ever”-questions). In fact, only at the third round in 1999-2000 did we manage to insert the “ever-cohabited” question in the European Values Survey (EVS). In the two earlier rounds, there are large samples of married respondents, but no information whatsoever about their different household formation careers.

The overall outcome of this section is that there should be an ordering of individual household positions along the vertical axis of Figure 4. In this ordering, cohabitants without children ( $Coh0$ ) should score highest on all non-conformist value orientations, followed by singles and formerly married ( $FmNu$ ). Residents in parental households should come next. More toward the opposite pole are married persons without children, cohabiting parents, and married parents who ever-cohabited. Married parents who never cohabited should constitute the most conservative group.

Finally, the “footprints” scheme is important for the SDT theory for several reasons. Firstly, it connects demographic choices explicitly to a dynamic model of cultural change. In doing so, it goes much further than the neo-classic economic “adjustment for tastes” which merely recognizes static “addictions” (Becker, 1996). Secondly, empirically the “footprints” can be checked in cross-sections and for a wide variety of items. And thirdly, we can use the “footprints” to follow the SDT geographic diffusion throughout Europe, and further to other, non-European settings. The latter has become possible mainly thanks to the European and World Values Surveys. We shall now turn our attention to these empirical findings for a set of European countries.

#### 4.2. Do we find the footprints of selection and adaptation in the new SDT countries?

In this empirical section we make use of 80 attitude or value items that were used in the 1999-2000 round of the European Values Studies. In this chapter, EVS-data are used for all respondents in the age bracket 18 to 45. The items are listed in Table 2, and they are all dichotomized with the dummy score of unity given to the non-conventional or non-conformist end of the scale. Such a uniform recoding facilitates the subsequent inspection of value profiles according to household situation.

The list of table 2 contains 9 major subjects. The largest number of items (15) pertains to attitudes related to marriage as an institution, the qualities needed for the success of marriage, to the meaning of parenthood and parent-child duties, and to the degree of permissiveness with respect to sexual freedom, divorce and abortion. Secularism is covered by 9 items. They indicate the rejection of traditional beliefs (heaven, hell etc), a low level of individual religious sentiments, a low level of participation and trust in religious institutions and practices. The civil morality set, with 12 items, captures permissiveness toward various forms of deviance, but also ethical acceptance of interference in life and death (abortion, suicide). The political set of 11 items deals with distrust in institutions, protest proneness, “post-materialism”, and the rejection of authority more generally. The social distance and tolerance set is made up of 8 items, which indicate the acceptability as neighbors of various types of persons belonging to ethnic or sexual minorities. The expressive values contain both the work and the socialization batteries. The former group of 8 items indicates the preference for intrinsic work qualities over material rewards and status. The socialization items (7) show the preference for independence and imagination rather than for conformity and respect. The identification items (6) distinguish between more global and transnational interests versus national or local ones. However, a global or third world orientation is not only negatively correlated with national pride, but also with trust in international organizations. The last set of 4 items indicates a retreat from social and political life, absence of memberships or voluntary activities, a distrust in people more generally, and a lack of interest in politics. In all further analyses, these 80 items will be used without prior data reduction, such as factor analysis. Hence, no particular structure or simplification is imposed prior to further statistical analysis.

#### TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

At this point the value profiles can be established according to the various household positions used in the “footprints” diagram. The profiles that are being displayed here are “net” ones, i.e. they are those of the 8 household positions remaining after controls for age and age squared (continuous), gender (2 categories), education (4), profession and occupation (9 categories, including separate ones for “students”, “unemployed” and “housewives”), and urbanization (2). The controls themselves were performed through Multiple Classification Analysis, and the outcomes take the form of net household types deviations from the overall mean (here: overall percentage with the given attitude). Such net “household-profiles” of deviations are computed for all 80 items. Subsequently a first simple tally of the number of net *positive* deviations, i.e. in the non-conformist direction, can be produced for each household position. Such a tally is already highly revealing of the overall non-conformism profile and of the “footprints” of the selection/adaptation process.

The outcomes are displayed in Figures 5, 6 and 7. Figure 5 gives the number of net positive deviations in the non-conformist direction for the 80 items and the 8 household positions for major groups of countries. Scandinavia-2 is made up of Sweden and Denmark, West-3 consists of Belgium, France and Germany, South-2 contains Spain and Portugal (not yet enough cohabitants in 1999 in the sample of other Mediterranean countries), Central-7 comprises Croatia, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania, and East-5, finally, is composed of Belarus, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Romania and Bulgaria.



## FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

Figure 5 immediately shows that the “footprints” are found in all these major regions of Europe, including the “old SDT” countries like Sweden and Denmark as well as in the “SDT-newcomers” of Southern, Central and Eastern Europe. The five profiles are also remarkably similar:

- Cohabitants without children (*Coh0*) indeed tend to exhibit the most non-conformist values profile of all;
- marriage and parenthood are associated with major readjustments in the conventional and conformist direction;
- married parents who never cohabited (*Mar+N*) display by far the most conservative attitudes on all dimensions involved;
- the earlier cohabitation experience indeed appears to leave a more permanent imprint in the non-conformist direction, even after marriage and parenthood had been achieved (compare *Mar+E* to *Mar+N*);
- and also divorce (*FmNu*) produces a move away from the stability of conventional opinions held by married parents.

The main surprise of the exercise was that respondents who were still living in the parental home displayed a high degree of heterogeneity according to the country grouping used here. One could expect that in the early SDT countries late home leavers are more rare and more clearly a “residual group” that is left behind as a result of more conservative values. This holds very clearly in the Scandinavian group with the smallest number of net positive deviations for the *Respar* category. But it does not hold so well for the Western group, and particularly not for France, where home-stayers have much more libertarian and non-conformist attitudes. Evidently, there are more intricate mechanisms at work here that we cannot capture with the simple and small surveys of the EVS-type.

Figures 6 and 7 provide a finer breakdown to illustrate that the “footprints” pattern still holds remarkably well for smaller geographical units (single countries or pairs of countries) and that it emerges for the various subsets of attitude items as well. As indicated in Table 2, the “A” set of items deal with secularism, ethics and morality including these pertaining to the family, the “B” set with the political and societal orientations, and the “C” set mainly with the expressive values. Figure 7 then illustrates that the typical footprints profiles according to the household positions are showing up for all three sets of attitudes and in all major country groups.

## FIGURES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE.

The bottom line is that the Central and Eastern European countries and the two Iberian ones are not in any way exceptional with respect to the dynamics that link values to choices and choices to values as hypothesized in the selection/adaptation framework. Also, earlier values and choices retain a more lasting imprint, even after the completion of other transitions later on in life. And finally, these strikingly similar profiles illustrate that the dynamics of the SDT are equally operating in the former Communist and Iberian countries as in the Western and Northern parts of Europe. These parts of Europe are squarely no longer exceptional. And, the emerging of the

new SDT living arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean will not come as a surprise either.

### **5. Can the SDT also spread to non-Western populations?**

At present everyone has come to terms with the fact that the FDT is a worldwide phenomenon. Furthermore, everyone equally agrees with the observation that the FDT can take-off at just about any level of economic development, and in strictly rural as well as urban societies. But, will the SDT be equally universal? Or indeed, as David Coleman expects, remain a regional idiosyncrasy? Obviously, we can only speculate about the probabilities of such a more global diffusion, in the same way that one could only speculate in the 1950s and 1960s about the eventuality of pervasive fertility control emerging in the then developing countries. Hence, what are the chances of the SDT for spreading beyond European populations in the coming decades?

We propose to answer this question for two demographic components separately. Firstly, will sub-replacement fertility spread far beyond Europe and become an intrinsic part of non-European reproductive systems too? And secondly, will the nuptiality system diversify and accommodate new forms of partner choice and living arrangements as well?

There is already a sound factual basis for a positive answer to the first question, as illustrated by the most recent total fertility rates (TFRs) published in the 2000 United Nations Demographic Yearbook (UN, 2002). Not only Japan (latest TFR = 1.34), but also South Korea (1.41) and all Chinese populations (Mainland (1.80), Hong Kong (0.97), Macao (0.91) Taiwan (1.76), Singapore (1.58)) currently have sub-replacement fertility or have had it for more than a decade. At present, Thailand (TFR=2.00) is about to join that group as well. Hence, much of the Far East is already a part of the sub-replacement belt. But sub-replacement fertility also emerged in other countries with less accommodating religions and/or with much lower standards of living than the industrialized West or Far East. Striking examples of largely Muslim populations with sub-replacement fertility are those of Kazakhstan (TFR=1.75) and Persian speakers of Iran (TFR= 1.XX ). But also Caribbean populations have joined the sub-replacement club: Barbados (TFR=1.50), Cuba (1.60), Trinidad & Tobago (1.72), Martinique (1.80) and Puerto Rico (1.87). And last but not least, sub-replacement fertility is also reported by the Demographic and Health surveys held in Indian states in 1998-99 (International Institute for Population Sciences, 2000). More specifically, sub-replacement fertility is found in Goa (1.77) and Kerala (1.96), and furthermore in the urban parts of the states of Karnataka (1.89), Himachal Pradesh (1.74), Punjab (1.79), Jammu & Kashmir (1.66), West Bengal (1.69) and Assam (1.50). It comes therefore as no surprise that the United Nations Population Division now envisages the possibility of sustained sub-replacement fertility spreading to much larger parts of the world, and that the latest set of UN World Population projections (forthcoming, 2004) provide a new “sub-replacement scenario” (XXXXXX)

In the domains of nuptiality and household formation, very significant increases in mean ages at first marriage for both men and women have occurred in the last four decades, and this was witnessed in all types of societies, including Muslim and Sub-Saharan populations. William J. Goode’s 1963 prediction, i.e. formulated some 40

years ago, that this was going to happen as a part of an overall demographic revolution was visionary in this respect. Equally impressive in Goode's "*World Revolution and Family Patterns*" is that he not only connects these increases in ages at marriage to the classic structural features such as industrialization and urbanization, but equally to shifts in the ideational system, and more particularly to the rise in individual autonomy, gender egalitarianism (he calls it "equalitarianism", 1963, p54), free partner choice and a weakening of older normative and institutional influences. In other words, families all over the world would converge to both more nuclear households and more conjugal relations, and would move away from extended and "patriarchal" types. And families would not solely do so because of structural changes or economic constraints but also because of the growing importance attached to individual freedom of choice and right to self-determination (which Goode unambiguously applauds in his last paragraphs, p.380). Yet, in Goode's reasoning, this individualistic outlook is not so much a goal in its own right but mainly an outcome, as the last sentence in "*World Revolution*" shows:

*"For me, then, the major and sufficing justification for the newly emerging family patterns is that they offer people at least the potentialities of greater fulfillment, even if most do not seek it or achieve it."* (1963, p.380)

In the sense of the SDT, self-fulfillment and articulations of autonomy are *primary* ideational goals *in their own right*, sought by a majority of people and on a global level, and these, frequently in conjunction with structural factors, set the direction of change in household formation and composition. And if rising ages at marriage connected to longer male schooling, rising costs of living and economic hardship relative to material expectations, and occurring within the framework of arranged unions are still part and parcel of the FDT, further rises in ages at marriage for women connected to expanding female education and empowerment, diminishing age gaps between spouses, free partner choice, premarital sex and eventually a rise in cohabitation or in other unconventional types of union are sure signs of the onset of the SDT. However, since the classic statistical data collection apparatus is still oriented to the traditional household types, we may be slow in discovering the emergence of non-traditional and more transient living arrangements. In short, we will only discover such new patterns if sufficiently fine tuned demographic surveys are consciously and purposefully making the effort of probing into these matters.

The answer to the question whether or not the SDT can spread well beyond the western societies and cultures is probably positive. Admittedly it will remain difficult to make a neat separation between the effects of structural factors and ideational ones respectively on marriage postponement and low fertility. But that has never been easy, not even in the case of the FDT, in the first instance because these sets of factors are often causally interconnected. Furthermore, one should also realize that mass media are producing a "world culture" in which individual autonomy and self-actualization have a very prominent, if not dominant place, and that these provide both motivations and justifications for the onset of the SDT. Political, religious and ideological backlashes are of course always possible (e.g. both Christian and Muslim fundamentalist reactions), but at least up till now the experience has been that such reactions have not been strong enough to cause decisive trend reversals.

Our bet is that David Coleman's conjecture that the SDT will only remain a local European or Western "parochial" phenomenon will turn out to be wrong as well, and that more and more evidence pointing in the direction of the SDT will emerge in the next two decades in many non-Western populations.

## **6. Conclusions**

Before formulating an answer to the four questions addressed in this chapter, we would like to make a major preliminary point. We do so to avoid subsequent misunderstanding about the role of culture in the SDT. And this point is that the SDT-theory fully recognizes the effects of macro-level structural changes and of micro-level economic calculus. Only, it does not consider these explanations as "sufficient", but merely as "necessary" or "non-redundant". By the same token, also cultural explanations are non-redundant, but equally insufficient. More specifically, the SDT-theory does not consider cultural change as endogenous to any economic model, but as a necessary additional force with its own exogenous effects on demographic outcomes. Also, culture is not treated as some form of "addiction", nor as a fixed script, but as a dynamic set of value orientations. As such these orientations can change at the individual level and they can be linked recursively to the unfolding of the life course. And they can also change at the collective level during particular periods of time, or shift to new configurations with the succession of cohorts. Moreover, these ideational shifts can occur at a very different household income levels, at a wide variety of durations of education, and at highly varied levels of economic development.

With these remarks in mind, we shall now turn to the four questions formulated in the introduction.

Question 1: Is the SDT merely a continuation of the FDT and only a description of a "secondary" set of phenomena?

The SDT differs significantly from the FDT both in terms of demographic predictions as well as in terms of the underlying motivations. Since the SDT predicts generalized sub-replacement fertility (in tandem with a greater plurality of living arrangements and household structures), it also points at the growing importance of international and global migration. Furthermore, the SDT predictions are departing from the benign equilibrium outcomes of the FDT (such as a stationary population, not much need for migration, and the predominance of the stable conjugal family). By contrast, the SDT sees much rougher seas ahead. Firstly, sustained sub-replacement fertility will cause extra aging and shake all welfare systems. Secondly, such low fertility will stimulate replacement migration, not so much as an antidote to aging but as a means of countering labor force shortages. And thirdly, some of the new living arrangements may be more unstable than the traditional arrangements, or even less adequate as a setting for procreation and especially socialization. Union dissolution will continue to be a major cause of low fertility as well. Would such outcomes be no more than "secondary" phenomena?

Question 2: Is the SDT spreading to the rest of Europe?

Here, the answer is definitely positive. The SDT did not stop at the Pyrenees or Alps, and it crossed into Central and Eastern Europe as well. In all these areas we witnessed a rise in the share of extra-marital births, which clearly points in the direction of new contexts of procreation (cohabitation, single parenthood). Equally striking is the finding that the individual value-profiles according to living arrangement turned out to be so similar in all parts of Europe. Admittedly, the indicators used here are not perfect, but they are not exactly meaningless either. But, for a finer resolution and a much needed update of the picture, a new round of demographic surveys is required.

Question 3: Were the demographic changes since 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe mainly the outcome of the crisis associated with the transition to a market economy?

The crisis of the 1990s in Eastern and Central Europe was definitely propitious for the postponement of marriages and births, and hence for the precipitous dip to very low levels of fertility. But a purely crisis-based explanation is untenable. Firstly, much of the crisis is over in countries such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where GDP per capita has risen to levels higher than in the 1980s, and there has been no return to earlier marriage or higher fertility. Instead, cohabitation is spreading and so is procreation outside marriage. Hence, something else must have happened in addition to the initial crisis response. Secondly, the SDT seems to advance faster in the countries with the more successful economic and political performance, which is again indicative of the importance of factors other than those associated with the economic crisis. Among these other factors that produce the sustained trend in the direction of the SDT there are again major structural and cultural ones. On the structural side, for instance, the post-Communist era has been characterized by expanding female education in several of these countries, and this has definitely contributed to the postponement of marriages and births (e.g. Kantarova, 2004). And similarly, the rise of individual autonomy and freedom of choice has legitimized the adoption of non-traditional living arrangements in a very short time. These features will not be reversed that easily, and hence the SDT will continue on its course as in the former Western part of Europe.

Question 4: Can the SDT spread to other continents and non-European societies?

At present this is obviously a major new question for demographers and other social scientists to ponder. The SDT prediction may ultimately prove to be wrong and end up on the scrap heap together with other erroneous forecasts, but its expectations are nonetheless very clear:

1. The normative and institutional props of traditional union formation and household structures will systematically weaken in all societies that move in the direction of egalitarian and democratic systems governed by the respect for individual choice. This implies that other forms of union formation will expand in the wake of such ideational developments. The political evolution of countries is then at least as crucial for the onset of the SDT as their economic futures.
2. Alongside individual autonomy, also self-realization will become a major goal in its own right. This will simultaneously produce a rising demand for higher

education, especially among women, stimulate other tastes and life-styles, and result in sub-replacement fertility.

3. Communication technology and mass media are spreading knowledge about all new forms of behavior to the remotest corners of the world. Moreover, as the Thornton, Binstock and Ghimire chapter (this volume, 2004) shows, new forms of behavior are associated by the public itself with being “more advanced” and “more developed”. Just like the FDT in many developing countries benefited from this communication revolution, so will also the diffusion of the SDT be enhanced by global communication. Fundamentalist reactions are likely to occur in response to these global ideational shifts, but so far their success has been too limited to stem the overall shift toward “post-materialist” and expressive value orientations.

## **7. Acknowledgements**

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Table 1: Overview of demographic and societal characteristics respectively related to the FDT and SDT in Western Europe.


FDT	SDT
<p><b>A. Marriage</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rise in proportions marrying, declining age at first marriage</li> <li>• Low or reduced cohabitation</li> <li>• Low divorce</li> <li>• High remarriage</li> </ul> <p><b>B. Fertility</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decline in marital fertility via reductions at older ages, lowering mean ages at first parenthood</li> <li>• Deficient contraception, parity failures</li> <li>• Declining illegitimate fertility</li> <li>• Low definitive childlessness among married couples.</li> </ul> <p><b>C. Societal background</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preoccupations with basic material needs: income, work conditions, housing, health, schooling, social security. Solidarity prime value</li> <li>• Rising memberships of political, civic and community oriented networks. Strengthening of social cohesion</li> <li>• Strong normative regulation by State and Churches. First secularisation wave, political and social “pillarisation”</li> <li>• Segregated gender roles, familistic policies, “embourgeoisement”, promotion of breadwinner family model.</li> <li>• Ordered life course transitions, prudent marriage and dominance of one single family model.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fall in proportions married, rise in age at first marriage</li> <li>• Rise in cohabitation (pre- &amp; post-marital)</li> <li>• Rise in divorce, earlier divorce</li> <li>• Decline of remarriage following both divorce and widowhood</li> <li>• Further decline in fertility via postponement, increasing mean age at first parenthood, structural subreplacement fertility</li> <li>• Efficient contraception (exceptions in specific social groups)</li> <li>• Rising extra-marital fertility, parenthood within cohabitation</li> <li>• Rising definitive childlessness in unions</li> <li>• Rise of "higher order" needs: individual autonomy, self-actualisation, expressive work and socialisation values, grass-roots democracy, recognition. Tolerance prime value.</li> <li>• Disengagement from civic and community oriented networks, social capital shifts to expressive and affective types. Weakening of social cohesion.</li> <li>• Retreat of the State, second secularisation wave, sexual revolution, refusal of authority, political "depillarisation".</li> <li>• Rising symmetry in gender roles, female economic autonomy.</li> <li>• Flexible life course organisation, multiple lifestyles, open future.</li> </ul>

Table 2: Overview of 80 items used in the current analysis, EVS 1999-2000

<u>Topics &amp; corresponding items</u>	<u>Item description</u>
Marriage and family: A1-A15	Marriage outdated institution (A1); children not necessary life fulfilment (A2); parents must not sacrifice for children (A3); justified: casual sex (A4), adultery (A5), divorce (A6), abortion (A7); important for marriage: tolerance & understanding (A8), sharing chores (A9), talking (A10), time together (A11), happy sexual relations (A12); not very important for success marriage: faithfulness (A13), children (A14); single motherhood acceptable (A15).
Religion: A16-A24	Not believing in: god (A16), sin (A17), hell (A18), heaven (A19); no comfort from religion (A20), no moments of prayer or meditation (A21); god not at all important in life (A22); distrust church (A23), religious faith not mentioned as socialisation trait (A24).
Civil morality: A25-A36	Justified: soft drugs (A25), homosexuality (A26), joyriding (A27), suicide (A28), euthanasia (A29), speeding (A30), drunk driving (A31), accepting bribe (A32), tax cheating (A33), lying (A34), tax evasion by paying cash (A35), claiming unentitled state benefits (A36).
Politics: B1-B11	Distrust in institutions: education system (B1), army (B2), police (B3), justice system (B4), civil service (B5); participated or willing to participate in: unofficial strikes (B6), attending unlawful demonstrations (B7), joining boycotts (B8), occupying buildings (B9); not more respect for authority (B10); post-materialist (B11).
Identification: B12-B17	Identification with “Europe and World” (B12), not with “own village or town” (B13), not very or quite proud with own nationality (B14); no priority for national workers (B15); no trust EU (B16) or UN (B17).
Retreat: B18-B21	Not member any voluntary organisation (B18); no voluntary work (B19); people cannot be trusted (B20); never discuss politics (B21).
Socialisation: C1-C7	Not mentioned as desirable trait in educating children: hard work (C1), obedience (C2), good manners (C3), unselfishness (C4), tolerance & respect (C5); stressed as desirable: independence (C6), imagination (C7).
Work qualities: C8-C15	Not mentioned as desirable job aspect: good hours (C8), promotion (C9); stressed as desirable: respected job (C10), responsible job (C11), meeting people (C12), useful for society (C13), interesting work (C14), enabling initiative (C15).
Social distance: C16-C23	Not wanted as neighbours: large families (C16), right wing people (C17); no objection to have as neighbours: aids patients (C18), unstable people (C19), criminal record (C20), drug addicts (C21), homosexuals (C22), immigrants (western countries) or gypsies (central European countries) (C23).

Note: all items have been coded in the “non-conformist” direction.

Figure 4: Flow chart of Life Course transitions and hypothesized changes in values orientations stemming from selection – adaptation mechanism.



Respar = Resident with parents.  
 Single = Living alone or sharing, never married and not in union  
 Coh 0 = Cohabiting, no children  
 Coh + = Cohabiting with children  
 Mar 0 = Married, no children  
 Mar + E = Married, children, never cohabited  
 Mar + N = Married, children, ever cohabited  
 FmNu = Formerly married or in union, not in new union.

Figure 1: Extra-marital births as percent of all births -- Baltic, Central and Eastern Europe




Figure 2: Extra-marital births as percent of all births -- Southern Europe




Figure 3: Extra-marital births as percent all births -- Northern and Western Europe






Chart 7.1: Number of positive net deviations (= non-conformist) for 80 items according to household position; 1999 EVS results for five groups of European countries after control for other covariates.





	Res.par.	Single	Coh 0	Coh +	Mar 0	Mar + n	Mar + e	FmNu
Austria	32	52	36	57	48	27	51	44
Germany	35	53	46	49	40	24	39	50
Belgium	55	52	57	42	32	14	33	59
France	61	61	63	50	34	11	24	55
Czech R.	44	39	58	40	52	24	45	48
Cro/Slvn	47	47	57	53	42	16	57	46
Pol/Lith.	48	47	52	42	42	29	48	44
Hun/Slvk	41	51	46	46	38	17	56	58
Spa/Port	50	54	64	44	36	19	28	46
Swe/Den	28	44	58	51	40	23	38	28
item mns	48	65	67	54	34	10	48	57



	Res.par.	Single	Coh 0	Coh +	Marr 0	Mar+N	Mar+E	FmNu
West A	19	29	33	27	12	2	24	28
Central A	18	28	25	25	16	7	31	29
East A	12	21	22	29	15	10	30	30
West B	15	16	16	14	9	2	8	14
Central B	10	14	14	13	10	4	20	16
East B	10	14	7	15	10	3	13	17
West C	8	15	17	12	11	7	15	13
Central C	17	13	18	16	12	4	15	10
East C	15	13	18	11	12	7	11	8

MI -FIGURE 7

